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Abstract
The paper argues that the incidence of moral hazard played a significant role in the 
2007/2008  credit  crunch.  In  particular,  bank  traders  subjected  to  asymmetric 
compensation structures have an incentive to take excessive risks even when the 
bank's shareholders would prefer prudent investment. Traders' incentives are shown 
to be unaffected by capital regulations, with the associated financial burden falling 
upon the taxpayer through deposit insurance or government bail-outs. Selected case 
studies further indicate that the phenomenon of “gambling traders” was widespread 
during the credit crunch, when high bonuses tempted bank employees to invest in 
risky subprime-backed securities. The intransparency of structured products and the 
inaccuracy  of  credit  ratings  contributed  to  the  employees'  ability  to  conceal  the 
underlying risk from the banks' shareholders. The analysis points to an urgent need 
to reform compensation practices in the financial sector.
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1 Introduction
“Increased  subprime  lending  has  been  associated  with  higher  levels  of  delinquency, 
foreclosure and, in some cases, abusive lending practices.”1 This statement by Edward M. 
Gramlich,  a  Federal  Reserve  official,  sounds  very  commonplace  in  a  time  where  global 
financial  markets  are shaken with the turmoil  of the 2007/2008 credit  crunch that became 
known as the “subprime crisis”. But Mr. Gramlich made this statement in May 2004.
The subprime crisis started to unfold in mid-2007, featuring rising default rates on mortgages, 
falling prices of highly-rated and previously extremely popular securities, the eventual drying 
up of funding markets for many banks and investment vehicles, and the subsequent failure of 
many affected institutions. Everyone seemed surprised. Listening to companies' statements, 
the sizable losses they suffered in 2007 came completely unanticipated. After all, the highly 
profitable structured debt instruments which had bolstered their returns on equity to record 
levels over the past years carried an AAA credit rating – that is, they were labelled “safe 
except for a small tail risk” by major rating agencies. 
With hindsight, it is acknowledged that the securities' high returns essentially reflected the 
high risk premia of the underlying collateral, which often involved subprime loans of poor 
quality. But is it plausible to assume that market insiders like mortgage lenders, originators of 
subprime-backed securities and expert security traders in large banks  did not know this in 
advance? Could they have been so ignorant of the deteriorating conditions in the subprime 
market that they  had to rely exclusively on credit  ratings as an indicator of asset quality? 
Considering their expertise as well as early warnings like those of Mr.Gramlich, it does not 
seem likely.
Presuming that the considerable risk underlying the structured debt boom was to some extent 
predictable, why were agents so eager to participate in it? An obvious possibility would be 
that the people who were in charge of the decision to lend to shaky subprime borrowers, or to 
invest in subprime-backed securities, profited from their decision without bearing the full risk 
of their action. Such an incentive structure is commonly known as moral hazard.
This paper aims to analyse and illustrate how the incidence of moral hazard might have been 
conducive to the structures leading up to the credit crunch of 2007/2008. It focuses on the 
particular  type  of  moral  hazard  which  occurs  when  bank  employees  are  subject  to 
asymmetric compensation systems, which give them an incentive to make risky investment 
1 Edward Gramlich, cited from Krugman (2007).
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decisions (“gamble”) for their company, reaping high short-term bonuses and walking away 
with the profits when the “gamble” (and their company) fails. The analysis will be conducted 
against the backdrop of capital regulations (such as Basel II) and deposit insurance, taking 
into account a possible cost to taxpayers.
Furthermore, an attempt to “untangle” the subprime mess will shed light on banks' incentive 
to originate high-risk securities and, via securitisation, pass on credit risk to investors and off-
balance sheet conduits, earning large fees in the process.
Chapter 2 outlines the developments which led to the credit crunch, introducing the reader to 
the concept of securitisation and its connection to deteriorating subprime lending standards. 
Chapter  3  develops  a  theoretical  approach to  moral  hazard  structures  for  traders  by first 
reviewing the canonical model of moral hazard in banking, and subsequently allowing for a 
trader in the model. The empirical plausibility of such structures is discussed through case 
studies in chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes.
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2 The Credit Crunch in a Nutshell
It has now become common knowledge that the remarkable performance of the United States' 
residential housing sector for more than a decade was a mere bubble: In the ten years prior to 
2005, U.S. house prices increased by an annual 5.4 percent on average (68.9 percent over the 
whole period), even throughout periods when overall economic performance was weak.2 By 
fall 2004, the U.S. price-rent ratio had increased to 18 percent above its long-run average.3 
The bubble burst in early 2006, and by June 2006 sales of new homes had fallen by 15 percent 
compared to the previous year.4 
The housing bubble was accompanied by a “housing finance” bubble, which turned out to 
continue for an entire year after the housing bubble had burst. During the boom, a long period 
of increasing real estate prices had encouraged borrowers to take up mortgages on existing or 
newly bought properties, relying on the prices to climb up further so that they could refinance 
their mortgage on better terms in the future - using the higher value of their collateral. In turn, 
mortgage  lenders  readily  provided  cheap  credit  to  all  classes  of  borrowers.  Of  the  total 
outstanding mortgages made, 14 percent were dubbed “subprime”.5 This term refers to loans 
made  to  borrowers  with poor  credit  ratings,  who do not  qualify  for  market  interest  rates 
because of risk factors like insufficient income, lack of employment, or poor credit history. 
Alone  in  2005,  new  subprime  mortgages  worth  $625  billion  were  written,  followed  by 
another $600 billion in 2006 – a total of almost 10 percent of the United States GDP.6 Many 
of those mortgages  featured  low interest  rates  (“teaser  rates”)  in  the beginning,  adjusting 
upwards substantially after two or three years. Not surprisingly, when housing prices started 
to decline in mid-2006, in particular the weakest of borrowers found themselves in growing 
financial  distress, being unable to refinance their mortgage and thus facing foreclosure. In 
February 2007, a significant rise in delinquency rates on mortgages was first noted, causing 
the  popular  adjustable  rate  mortgages  (ARM)  to  reset  their  rates  upward,  which  further 
increased pressure on borrowers, boosting foreclosures in a vicious circle.  RealtyTrac,  the 
provider of the largest U.S. foreclosure database, reported almost 1.3 million of properties 
subject to foreclosure during 2007 – an increase of 75 percent from 2006.7
2 Cf. e.g. FRBSF (2004), p. 1.
3 The price-rent ratio is the ratio of the average house price and the annual rent for a comparable house.  If the 
fundamental value of a house is taken to be the discounted value of the future rent that could be earned on it, 
large upward movements in the price-rent ratio can be interpreted as a sign of a possible bubble.
4 Cf. Lahart (2007), p. C1.
5 Cf. Bernanke (2007).
6 Cf. Lahart (2007), p. C1.
7 Cf. RealtyTrac (2008). 
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2.1 Securitisation and the Boom in Cheap Credit
The key to understanding why institutions lent so much money to people with low income or 
a poor credit history in the first place is to look at the concept of securitisation (see also figure 
1). Securitisation refers to the increasingly popular bank practice of pooling and repackaging 
loans  and other  cash-flow producing assets.  The  newly originated  structured products are 
tradeable  securities,  which effectively allow the bank to  pass on credit  risk to  third-party 
investors.   The  most  common  terminology  for  these  securities  are  collateralised  debt 
obligations (CDOs). To originate a CDO, the bank forms a portfolio of various types of assets 
like  credit  card  receivables,  corporate  bonds,  or  mortgages.  A  central  feature  of  most 
securities is that they are sliced into different “tranches” before they are sold to investors. 
“Tranches” of different seniority levels refer to securities with different risk classes, albeit 
with the same underlying portfolio: The “super senior tranche” is the safest, offering a low 
interest to investors, but also enjoying the highest priority of repayment.8 Therefore they are 
classical debt capital, usually with an AAA credit rating. The most junior tranche, in contrast, 
only gets paid after all investors of other tranches have  been paid, but is rewarded with a 
substantial share of the profits (it is either unrated or B). Since investors in the junior tranches 
are the first to bear losses incurred by the portfolio, the junior tranches are comparable to 
equity  capital.  Depending  on  the  security,  there  can  be  arbitrary  numbers  of  mezzanine 
tranches in between junior and senior. Note also that the return on junior tranche investment is 
often highly leveraged: The bigger the proportion of senior tranche capital to junior tranche 
capital, the higher the proportional loss (gain) for junior tranche investors for a given negative 
(positive) portfolio return. 
The concept of pooling and tranching is common to a wide class of tradeable instruments. The 
underlying portfolio can exclusively consist of mortgages (so-called collateralised mortgage 
obligations, CMOs, see figure 1), corporate bonds, a mixture of assets, or even a portfolio of 
CDOs.  In  all  cases,  securitisation  allows  banks  to  attract  different  investor  groups  with 
different degrees of risk aversion.
With their newly gained ability to pass on credit risk, banks no longer kept loans on their own 
books  –  they  simply  earned  a  commission  on  them  and  sold  them  on,  usually  after 
repackaging them as described.
8 Cf. e.g. Brunnermeier (2008), pp. 2 for an introduction to securitisation.
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With the diversification of credit risk and the distribution over many investors, credit markets 
became extremely efficient,  making credit  historically cheap.9 On the downside,  however, 
banks no longer had an incentive to closely monitor the financial health of those they were 
lending to – since the time the bank was exposed to the credit risk was mostly limited to the 
one to four months the bank needed for the origination of securities. 
Why was the boom in subprime mortgages instead of some other type of loan? For one thing, 
risk premia that could be charged on subprime mortgages were substantially higher than those 
for prime mortgages or other types of loans. Second, demand for mortgages in general was 
high because of the seemingly never-ending rise of real estate prices. Finally, the subprime 
business was so profitable everyone wanted to take part in it, boosting competition for clients, 
in consequence making lenders more aggressive in their marketing and lending terms, and 
less concerned regarding the quality of their customers – Why should they be picky if they are 
not the ones bearing the risk? The result were deteriorating lending standards and excessive 
lending,  including low- or no-documentation mortgages and so-called “NINJA loans” (No 
income,  no  job  or  assets).10 Empirical  evidence  confirms  the  adverse  link  between 
securitisation and lending standards.11 Apart from the subprime sector, there seems to have 
been another bubble in the corporate debt sector, displaying characteristics largely similar to 
the subprime bubble, and again featuring excessive and reckless lending.12
When in the spring of 2006 it became clear that the housing bubble was over, a normal market 
reaction  would  have  been  to  tighten  lending  standards  and  to  restrict  credit  to  “worthy” 
borrowers. But that is not what happened at first – according to senior loan officer surveys 
conducted by the Fed, most banks kept their lending standards for mortgage loans to private 
households  at  the  previous  lax  level  throughout  the  second  half  of  2006,13 arguing  that 
competition got stronger due to weaker demand for mortgages. It may seem paradoxical that 
the boom in securities which financed the real estate boom peaked well after house prices had 
started to decline: Throughout 2006 and early 2007, institutions kept issuing CDOs, which 
often carried subprime positions in their portfolio. New CDO issuance in 2006 went up to 
9 Cf. Brunnermeier (2008), pp. 7.  Further, the efficiency of risk diversification is clearly related to cheap 
credit: Assuming a concave utility function of the investor, and looking at a single loan,  the sum of paying a 
small risk premium to each investor for taking a small risk will be less than the one big premium that would 
have to be paid to a single investor for taking all of the risk.
10 For a slightly humorous but insightful article giving a basic overview of “predatory” mortgage products, see 
Pearlstein (2007), p. D1. Apparently the risks of these lending practices were neither new nor unrecognised, 
see Krugman (2007).
11 Cf. the results of Keys et al. (2008).
12 Cf. Berman (2007), p. C1.
13 Cf. e.g. Federal Reserve (2006), Table 1, Question 19 and Federal Reserve (2007), Table 1, Question 11.
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$187bn, a 72 percent increase from the previous year, and peaked in March 2007 at $38bn in 
one month.14
The biggest question remains: Why were CDOs and other structured products so popular with 
hedge funds, structured investment vehicles (SIVs), and other banks? The simple reason is 
that the new instruments promised higher returns than traditional fixed-income assets (like 
treasury bonds) even though they enjoyed the same credit rating. It is important to understand 
that the  senior tranches of a portfolio can easily receive an AAA rating,  even though the 
underlying assets are single-A rated. Further, even AAA does not imply a default risk of zero 
– it just means the tail risk of default does not exceed a certain well-defined probability.  For 
structured  products,  however,  the  different  tranches  were  always cut  off  precisely at  the 
maximum risk level allowed for whatever rating was desired by the issuer. In consequence, 
AAA-rated  super  senior  tranches  were  riskier  on  average  than  traditional  AAA-rated 
unstructured bonds (since some bonds could have zero default probability),  and thus super 
seniors could offer higher interest rates.
On top of that, Brunnermeier (2008) mentions several reasons why credit rating agencies may 
also have been overly optimistic in their ratings:15 First, their statistical model was based on 
historical data of low delinquency rates, but also tighter lending standards. Second, housing 
busts had so far been regional, making regionally diversified portfolios look fairly safe. Third, 
as credit rating agencies were paid by the institutions whose securities they were rating, issues 
of  moral  hazard  might  have  played  a  role.  Altogether,  ratings  were  so  favourable  that 
investors were led to believe the risk of their securities was negligible. A final reason for the 
popularity  of  structured  products  was  that  investors  did  not  have  to  shoulder  what  they 
perceived as a tail risk if they did not want to: They could insure themselves (“hedge”) against 
default by either buying a credit default swap (CDS, which works just like an insurance), or 
by purchasing insurance from a monoline insurer. Note that neither option eliminates risk, but 
both replace the credit risk of the borrower with the insolvency risk of the insurer.
2.2 Profiting from a Maturity Mismatch: SIVs and Conduits
A last topic we will briefly introduce here is the role  of structured investment vehicles (SIVs) 
and similar off-balance sheet entities.  SIVs, SIV-lites, or conduits (summarised as SIVs) are 
mostly  bank-run  programmes  which  make  profits  by  investing  in  high-interest  long-term 
illiquid assets and refinancing by issuing short-term asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), 
14 Data from Dealogic, cited from Lahart (2007), p. C1.
15 Cf. Brunnermeier (2008), p. 6.
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using the illiquid assets as collateral. Put differently, SIVs profit from a maturity mismatch in 
their balance sheet.16 The bonds that an SIV typically invests in are complex, mostly AAA-
rated, credit market instruments like asset-backed securities (ABS, not to be confused with the 
short-term ABCP),  mortgage-backed securities  (MBS),  or  CDOs (for  our  purposes,  ABS, 
MBS and CDOs are  very similar).  On the  liability  side,  the  ABCP which an  SIV issues 
(usually at a rate close to the interbank reference rate LIBOR) has an average maturity of 90 
days.  Since  this  is  substantially  shorter  than  the  maturity  of  its  assets,  an  SIV needs  to 
refinance frequently by selling new ABCP to pay back the expiring one. This exposes the 
vehicle to funding liquidity risk: The SIV quickly turns illiquid if it can no longer sell its 
ABCP (e.g. because markets dry up). To ensure sufficient funding, the bank which initiated 
the SIV (the “sponsoring bank”) usually grants a contractual credit line, a liquidity backstop. 
This has the important effect of ensuring an AAA credit rating for the SIV (given a highly 
rated sponsoring bank). An SIV is generally intransparent and opaque – i.e. investors in its 
ABCP can  generally  not  see  through to  the  structure  of  the  SIV's  balance  sheet  and  the 
underlying assets. The more important is a most favourable credit rating. The number and the 
asset volume of SIVs have grown substantially over the past years, before playing a key role 
in  the  current  crisis.17 The  incentives  for  banks  to  initiate  SIVs  are  based  on  the  legal 
independence of SIVs (which allows them to stay off banks' balance sheets) and range from 
regulatory arbitrage to cheap funding (see section 4.3). 
2.3 Timetable of Events
This section will briefly outline the developments in global financial markets from July 2007 
onwards, while selected cases will be analysed in more detail in chapter 4.
When  mortgage  defaults  notably  started  to  rise  in  early  2007,18 the  first  to  suffer  were 
mortgage  lenders  which  had  kept  mortgage  loans  on  their  books,  furthermore  third-party 
investors (individual or institutional) who had bought MBS, CDOs or ABS with subprime 
exposure (as a security declines in value if one of the loans in the portfolio defaults). Because 
of the complexity of structured products and the intransparency of banks' balance sheets, it 
was far from obvious for investors and market observers exactly who was holding what risks. 
The result was a vicious circle where rating agencies downgraded the credit rating of many 
subprime-related securities and the prices of these securities subsequently fell. With higher 
16 See Brunnermeier (2008), p. 4 for more details.
17 Also see Tett et al. (2008) for a discussion of the role of SIVs in the credit crunch.
18 See Bernanke (2007) for details on subprime developments. 
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mortgage default  rates and lower demand for securities,  ARM interest  rates increased and 
mortgage conditions in general worsened, putting additional pressure on borrowers. Defaults 
increased further, with subprime ARMs accounting for 6.8 percent of all mortgage loans but 
43  percent  of  all  foreclosures  (data  from  2007Q3).19 The  consequence  were  further 
downgrades and price decreases of structured products. By June 2007, the interest rates on 
corporate  credit  were  increasing  as  well,  signifying  higher  risk  premia  –  even  though 
corporations were generally well-capitalised and in no immediate danger. This spillover effect 
may have resulted from the fact that investors were becoming insecure about how to value 
structured products in general (including corporate credit products), and that confidence in 
credit ratings' accuracy had been shattered.20 
Investor's uncertainty about exactly what assets SIVs and conduits had on their balance sheet, 
and how damaged  those assets  were,  continuously increased.  A fundamental  turmoil  was 
caused when the markets for ABCP (which funded many SIVs and conduits) dried up in late 
July: Numerous “silent bank-runs” occurred when investors refused to “roll over” their ABCP 
assets, forcing the issuing institutions to disburse their ABCP upon reaching maturity.  SIVs, 
conduits, hedge funds and banks which had relied on ABCP short-term funding were unable 
to  find  new  buyers,  resulting  in  a  severe  liquidity  crisis  for  many  of  them.21 Without 
opportunities to refinance, they had no other option but to sell their long-term assets into a 
depressed market, leading to bankruptcy for some of them. Big banks which sponsored SIVs 
involuntarily got involved in the ABCP mess as SIVs (often for the first time in their history) 
had to draw on the credit lines which they had been granted to ensure high ratings (also see 
section 4.3). 
With the wide and untraceable dispersion of credit risk,  the unreliability of credit ratings, and 
the incalculable market risk of asset holdings, interbank markets froze up in August 2007. Not 
only were banks unable to assess counterparty risk (e.g.  because of possible links to off-
balance sheet vehicles) when lending to other banks, but also did they fail to anticipate what 
liquidity shortages they themselves might face. The result was a significant increase of the so-
called TED spread, which is often used as an indicator of the depth of the credit crunch in 
interbank markets (see figure 2). The TED spread is the difference between the LIBOR (the 
average interbank lending rate) and the U.S. treasury rate. It indicates banks' unwillingness to 
lend to one another instead of buying the essentially riskless treasury bond. 
19 Cf. MBA (2007). 
20 Cf. Brunnermeier (2008), p. 11.
21 Cf. Tett et al. (2008).
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The  “waves”  of  illiquidity  in  the  figure  were  due  to  new  market  information  (like  loss 
evaluations). A recent study further suggests that the true TED spread may have been higher 
as banks may likely have understated their true borrowing costs for reputational reasons.22 
From  July  2007  onwards,  numerous  big  banks  took  widespread  write-downs  on  asset 
holdings, others could not bear their liquidity commitments towards ABCP conduits or hedge 
funds and had to be bailed out or even failed.23 Several bank runs occurred, not sparing a 
leading  U.S.  investment  bank.  Chapter  4  examines  the  case  of  UBS,  whose  write-downs 
($38bn) rank among the largest, and the case of IndyMac, the largest bank failure the credit 
crunch has produced – so far.
The chapter closes with a warning: Today's global financial architecture and modern banking 
system  has  reached  a  level  of  complexity  that  renders  almost  any  description  of  what 
precisely led to the credit crunch necessarily incomplete. This brief introduction is therefore 
confined to give a very basic understanding of the mechanisms between borrowers, lenders 
and investors and serves as a foundation for the paper's subsequent focus on the influence of 
moral hazard during the credit crunch.
22 Cf. Mollenkamp (2008).
23 Cf. Buiter/Sibert (2007), Bartz/Atzler (2007), and Brunnermeier (2008), pp. 17.
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Figure 2: The TED Spread and the Three Waves of Illiquidity
Source: Mollenkamp (2008).
3 A Theory of Gambling Traders
3.1 Motivation
Many questions remain unanswered: Why did a market as small as the subprime market cause 
such extensive losses, and why did the crisis involve subprime-unrelated assets? Why did 
lenders,  investors,  and  rating  agencies  not  recognise  the  dangers  involved  in  subprime 
lending? And if they recognised the financial trouble that was about to come up, why did they 
not act on their suspicion, but went along with everyone else?
The amplification and spillover effects of the crisis are addressed by Adrian and Shin (2008), 
who show that banks and other investors effectively manage their portfolio risk by ensuring 
that their leverage ratio is high in booms and low in busts (i.e. leverage is pro-cyclical). In 
other words, they buy assets when their price rises (and take on new debt), and sell assets 
when their price falls (and pay back debt with the proceeds).24 This behaviour tends to be 
synchronised by many financial agents, triggering feedback effects from asset sales to further 
price drops, resulting in a liquidity spiral.25 This approach provides a sound answer as to how 
initial price declines of mortgage products (due to increased delinquency rates) could trigger 
large-scale asset sales, substantial write-downs and the drying up of funding markets.
Nevertheless, all of these reactions would likely not have been triggered, had banks (and other 
investors) chosen to invest prudently in the first place, and abstained from risky subprime 
products  promising  high  returns.  It  can  be argued that  the  risk associated  with  subprime 
products was underestimated, diluted in securitisation, and concealed by AAA credit ratings. 
But  the  erosion  of  mortgage  lending  standards  was  a  highly  visible  phenomenon,  the 
existence of a U.S. housing bubble was long conjectured, and at least expert investors in big 
banks and SIVs can be assumed to have had some idea about the risk that they were taking. 
Considering the existence of deposit insurance and the repeated occurrence of government 
bail-outs during the crisis, the issue of moral hazard arises: Did banks have an incentive to 
gamble because they could rely on not having to bear the consequences if the gamble failed?
How were these incentives influenced by the capital requirements which the Basel regulations 
imposed? And what role has been played by the internal decision procedures within a bank? 
The following  sections  will  develop  a  theoretical  approach to  a  particular  kind  of  moral 
hazard: The type of moral hazard which arises when investment bank traders are compensated 
for generating high returns, but are not punished for generating losses, the consequence of 
24 Cf. Adrian/Shin (2008).
25 See “loss spirals” and “margin spirals” in Brunnermeier (2008), pp. 23.
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which  are  overly  risky  investments  and  socially  inefficient  outcomes.  Before  investment 
decisions are thus analysed on a micro-level in section 3.3, the next section will outline a 
general  model  of  moral  hazard  in  banking  which  will  serve  as  a  basis  for  further 
considerations.
3.2 The HMS Framework
The model proposed by Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (HMS 2000) provides useful insights 
on  how  the  deposit  insurance  frequently  granted  by  governments  to  prevent  bank  runs 
endangers prudent bank behaviour, and how capital requirements (as imposed by Basel I and 
II) and deposit rate controls can help to preserve asset quality.26
Consider a bank that pays its depositors a gross interest rate r in exchange for funds, which 
the bank can invest in either a prudent or a gambling asset. The prudent asset yields a return α 
with certainty, while the gambling asset yields γ with probability θ and β with probability 1-θ. 
While  , the prudent asset has a higher expected return, 1− , i.e. the 
gambling asset is socially inefficient. For every unit of deposits mobilised, the bank invests k 
units of its own capital (deposits are normalised to 1 so total assets invested are 1+k). Equity 
capital  bears an opportunity cost  of   (note that  all  rates  are gross:   , , , r1 ). 
Finally,  deposits are insured, which implies that  the amount of assets which an individual 
bank can mobilise depends only on the degree of competition with other banks and on the 
interest rate offered by the banks.
For simplicity, assume =0 . For the bank, the one-period profit from investing in the safe 
asset is then P=1k −r− k  , while the expected one-period profit from gambling is 
G= 1k −r −k  , reflecting the fact that the bank does not have to pay back the 
deposits if the gamble fails. However, gambling and failing would result in the closure of the 
bank by the government, and so the bank would lose future profits. A bank will thus choose to 
invest prudently if and only if the discounted value of its future profits (in the following: its 
franchise value) from prudent investment are higher than those from gambling. The franchise 
value  of  a  prudent  bank  is  V P=∑
t=0
∞
tP=
 p
1−
for  an  infinite  time  horizon  and  a 
discount rate of δ. What is the franchise value of a gambling bank which risks to be closed 
every period? It receives the expected return G in the current period. With probability θ of 
winning this period, the bank lives for another period, with expected return  G . With 
26 See Hellmann et al. (2000), pp. 151 for the original model.
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probability  2  it lives to the third period and receives  2G , and so on. Its franchise 
value thus sums to
 V G=GG
22G... = ∑
t=0
∞
tG =
G
1−
.
The “No Gambling Condition” (NGC) V P≥V G becomes 
p
1−
≥
G
1− , which can 
be  rearranged  to  G−P≤1−V P for  stationary  values  of  the  parameters.  The 
interpretation is immediate: A bank will not gamble if the one-period return from gambling is 
less than the lost franchise value from prudent investment which the banks gives up with 
probability  1− .  Further  rearranging  yields  a  threshold  interest  rate  below which  no 
gambling will occur:
r NG≤[1−1k −]
1−
1k −k  .
If we now look at the case where banking regulation is absent and the market is characterised 
by perfect competition, the only feasible equilibrium is one where all banks gamble: Profits 
are zero in equilibrium, so no franchise values can be created which could keep banks from 
gambling. In contrast, the high profits a bank makes from a winning gamble enable it to offer 
higher  interest  rates  to  depositors: P=G=0 imply  r G=1k −

 k ,  whereas   the 
maximum rate offered by a prudent bank is r P=1k −k , where typically r Gr P is 
valid for small k (see figure 3). Note that neither bank will voluntarily hold any capital, as the 
assumption   implies that the return on capital is always below its opportunity 
cost  (also note  that  
drG
dk
0 ).  In  consequence,  a  symmetric  situation  of  prudent  banks 
would entail strong deviation incentives to steal the market. In equilibrium, competition for 
deposits will force all banks to gamble, at k=0 and r G= .
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One way out of this inefficient equilibrium (where the burden of deposit insurance is paid by 
the taxpayer) is to impose minimum capital requirements. Investing own capital forces banks 
to bear some of the downside risk of gambling, and it reduces the deposit rate which banks 
can pay at maximum. Because  
drG
dk
=
−
 
dr P
dk
=−  0 ,  rG decreases more 
steeply in k than rP  does. Once k is so high that the maximum interest rate affordable for a 
gambling bank is also affordable through prudent investment, it can be assumed that banks 
will  invest  prudently  in  equilibrium.  The  minimum  capital  requirement  consistent  with 
prudent investment in perfect competition is obtained by equating the two interest rates:
r P=rG
⇔ r=1k − k=1k −k
⇔k* = −

1−
 −−
As can be seen from figure 3, the two interest rates cross exactly on the NGC line (which 
increases in k for sufficiently myopic banks), implying that returns from both investments are 
equal in this situation (note that profits are still zero in equilibrium).
In the original paper, Hellmann et al. show that the capital requirement needs to be  strictly 
greater than k*: While banks at k* have no incentive to gamble at the asset allocation stage, at 
the deposit mobilisation stage the marginal profit from attracting one more depositor is higher 
for  gambling  than  for  prudent  banks.27 Setting  an  even  higher  k1k* implies
r P k1r Gk1 so  all  banks  will  invest  prudently.  However,  this  situation  is  pareto-
inferior: The interest rate r P k1 could equivalently be obtained with a capital requirement 
of k2 complemented by a deposit rate ceiling of r P k1 , so that depositors' profits are the 
same while banks' profits are higher (note that binding interest ceilings always entail positive 
franchise values for banks). Would deposit rate ceilings alone be sufficient? Without a capital 
requirement,  the ceiling would need to be set at r NG 0 , the y-intercept of the NGC line: 
At k=0 and any rr NG 0 , banks' “temptation” to gamble, G−P=−1−r ,28 
exceeds the “punishment”,  1−V P=1−
−r 
1− . Which of these options is best? If 
27 See Hellmann et al. (2000), p. 163 for a proof.
28 The temptation increases in r as higher interest payments increase the incentive to default on depositors. Note 
that temptation is graphed for the special case of θγ = α, so the line starts at the origin.
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banks' profits, consumers' interest and government's burden are taken into account, any point 
on  the  NGC  line  is  pareto-optimal  and,  for  r≤r k* ,  can  be  achieved  with  a  capital 
requirement of k and an interest ceiling of r NG k  . The common objective to achieve the 
highest  deposit  rate  consistent  with  prudent  investment  is  obtained  by  implementing  the 
original  minimum  capital  requirement  of  k*,  complemented  by  a  deposit  rate  ceiling  of 
r k* .
3.3 Including a Trader in the HMS Framework
The  model  proposed  by  Hellmann,  Murdock  and  Stiglitz  (2000)  provides  a  theoretical 
foundation  for  moral  hazard  in  banking,  treating  the  banks  as  unanimous  deciders  which 
maximise shareholders' value. The model developed in this section will relax this assumption: 
In a modern banking system with investment  banks,  hedge funds,  and SIVs, shareholders 
often  do  not  have  an  immediate  influence  on  a  bank's  investment  decisions.  Investment 
decisions  are  commonly  made  by  traders  employed  solely  for  this  purpose,  and  traders' 
interests may conflict with shareholders' interests depending on their compensation structure.
A recent model which has received considerable attention in the media is Foster's and Young's 
(2008) “Hedge Fund Game”29. The model is directed primarily towards hedge funds, SIVs, 
and other types of conduits, and describes how an unskilled trader can “game” the system, 
earning large fees while adding no value to the investment process.
Consider  a  hedge  fund of  $100 million,  set  up by a  manager  who promises  investors  to 
generate returns well above a benchmark return (e.g. treasury bonds) while not taking more 
risks. For these supposedly special abilities, he charges investors an annual management fee 
of 2 percent of funds under management, and a 20 percent incentive fee of the return above 
the benchmark.  He then writes covered options on an event that will occur with a chosen 
probability, say, the Dow Jones ends the year with an x percent gain, where x is chosen to 
occur with a 10 percent probability. If each option pays $1 million and buyers are risk-neutral, 
he can sell 100 options at $100,000 each, yielding $10 million.30 These proceeds allow for 10 
more  options,  yielding  another  $1  million.  The  manager  puts  the  $111  million  he  has 
mobilised into treasury bonds yielding 4 percent. After one year, he has a 90 percent chance 
that  the  options  are  worthless,  leaving  him  with  $115.4  million  gross.  Investors  will  be 
delighted: Their return net of fees will be  15.4−2−0.215.4−4 ≈ 11.1 percent per year, 
29 Cf. Foster/Young (2008).
30 Options are “covered” by the equity capital of the fund. More options could be sold if the fund was 
leveraged, but then margin requirements would have to be considered.
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while the manager makes $4.28 million. With a chance of 10 percent, however, the options 
are exercised, paying the holders a total $110 million. Of the remaining $5.4 million in the 
fund, the manager gets his $2 million management fee, leaving investors with a loss of 97 
percent. However, the manager has a 59 percent chance that the fund runs for five years at an 
annual  11.1  percent  net  return  without  crashing,  making  him seem like  an  exceptionally 
skilled manager when all he does is gambling. While this so-called “piggy-back strategy” is 
unrealistically transparent, Foster and Young claim that more sophisticated (and thus harder to 
detect) versions of this strategy are likely to be popular in the hedge fund market.31
Clearly,  hedge  funds  are  very  different  from the  commercial  banks  for  which  the  HMS 
framework was designed. Most importantly, hedge funds are largely unregulated, and there is 
no such thing as deposit  insurance or capital  requirements.  Nevertheless,  similarities  may 
exist in the compensation structure of hedge fund managers and bank traders. This makes it 
worthwhile  to look at  the consequences of inserting a “Foster-and-Young trader” into the 
HMS model. The empirical plausibility of this combination will be discussed in chapter 4.
Consider the original HMS model as described in section 3.2. Now suppose that shareholders 
lack knowledge about the available assets and their quality. In consequence, they delegate the 
investment decision to a trader, who is assumed to be more knowledgeable about the most 
attractive assets in the market.  This also implies that  shareholders will  not be able to tell 
whether the trader invests in a risky or in a safe asset – they only see the returns at the end of 
the year. Shareholders influence the trader's decision by choosing his payment structure: As in 
the Foster and Young model, the trader receives 2 percent of the funds under management as 
a basis annual salary, plus a 20 percent bonus on all returns above a benchmark. Since the 
trader has no influence on funding or leverage decisions but simply invests whatever funds 
are raised, his payment is calculated on the basis of total funds 1+k (where deposits are again 
normalised to 1 and shareholders choose capital k). We will further assume that the trader 
employed by the bank does not genuinely have the skills to recognise assets which are so 
undervalued that they promise a higher return than a safe benchmark asset while not bearing 
more risk. The trader is thus left with two options: He can either invest in the safe benchmark 
asset, yielding a (gross) return of α, or he can choose to game the system, which in our model 
is  represented  by  the  risky  asset  of  section  3.2,  yielding  γ  with  probability  θ  and  zero 
otherwise. Note that the trader is assumed to be aware of the true risk he is taking, while the 
shareholders are led to believe the high-return asset is as safe as the benchmark asset. Once 
31 Cf. Foster/Young (2008), p. 7.
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the gamble fails, however, shareholders realise what the trader was doing, and he gets fired. 
What is the best investment choice for an unskilled trader? The one-period return which the 
trader  gains  from  the  safe  asset  is  simply  his  management  fee, P
T=0,02 1k  .  His 
alternative is to gamble, at an expected return of G
T=[0,2−0,02] 1k  . The trader 
will choose to invest prudently if the present discounted value of his future earnings from 
prudent  investment  exceeds  the  one  from  gambling.  There  is  an  important  assumption 
involved here: Just like we assumed that a bank will be closed and no further profits made 
after a lost gamble, we will assume that a trader will not be able to find a new job once his 
scam has become public. The present discounted value for a gambling trader therefore takes 
into  account  that  all  future  income  is  lost  once  he  loses  a  gamble.32 Formally,  given 
PDV P=
P
T
1−
 and  PDV G=
G
T
1−
,  PDV P≥PDV G  implies that  
 p
T
1−
≥
G
T
1−
 or 
equivalently G
T−P
T≤1−PDV P . 
The condition becomes 0,2−1k ≤1−
0,02⋅1k 
1− and finally
≥
0,2−
0,2−0,021− .
A trader will be able to resist gambling if his discount rate is high enough, i.e. if he cares 
enough about his future income which he puts at risk when gambling. Note that the condition 
is  independent  of  the  amount  of  assets  under  management  or  the  level  of  equity  capital 
invested. To get an impression of the size of the necessary δ, consider the hedge fund case 
above with gross returns =1,04 , =1,15  and a winning probability of =0,9 . To invest 
prudently, the trader's discount rate needs to be ≥0,91 . 
In the following, let us look at the perspective of the bank which employs the trader. How do 
the bank's  interests  change compared to a situation where shareholders decide themselves 
about investments? The net gain which they hope a skilled trader will generate for them is
Skilled
B =1k −r−0,2−1k −k−0,02 1k  or
Skilled
B =0,80,21k −r−0,02k−0,02 .
For most (plausible) parameter values, this return will be higher than the return the bank can 
gain by investing prudently itself (otherwise the compensation structure “2 and 20” would be 
32 Thinking of current court cases like those against Société Générale's Jérôme Kerviel or Bear Stearns' Ralph 
Cioffi and Matthew Tannin, this may not seem so unrealistic.
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chosen differently). This, however, presumes that the trader is able to generate excess returns 
without additional risk. Unfortunately, it is not possible for the bank to distinguish between a 
skilled and an unskilled trader. What does this imply for its profits? Would it still be in the 
bank's own interest if an unskilled trader decided to gamble? If a trader is unskilled but invests 
prudently, the bank's one-period return is P
B=1k −r−0,02k−0,02 or
P
B=−0,021k −r−k .
For an unskilled trader who gambles, the bank's expected one-period return is 
G
B=[1k −r−0,2−1k ]− k−0,021k  or
G
B=[0,8 0,21k −r ]−0,02k−0,02 .
Whether it is in the bank's interest that an unskilled trader gambles depends mostly on the 
regulation imposed on the bank (note that we consider the alternative “unskilled trader invests 
prudently”, not “not employing a trader”). Adjusting the “No Gambling Condition” for the 
costs of the trader, the equation G
B−P
B≤1−V P yields a critical deposit rate of
r NG≤1−1k [−0,80,2]
1−
[−0,021k − k ]
below  which  the  bank  prefers  the  trader  not  to  gamble  as  their  returns  from  prudent 
investment are higher. How does the resulting NGC condition compare to the one from the 
original HMS model without the trader? Including the costs of a trader for the bank results in 
a reduction of the return of the gambling asset, which makes the NGC less stringent, i.e. rNG 
rises.  In addition,  the return to both assets  is  reduced due to the management  fee,  which 
decreases affordable deposit rates in general and thus rNG declines. The effect of the trader on 
the slope and intercept of the NGC curve is thus ambiguous and depends on the specific 
values of α, γ and θ.  What deposit rate will be paid? The interest rate which a bank will pay 
its  depositors  depends  on  the  level  of  competition  in  the  market.  Assuming  perfect 
competition  between  banks,  deposit  rates  in  equilibrium should be 
r P=−0,021k −k for  banks  with  prudent  portfolios  and 
r G=0,80,21k −
0,02
 k−
0,02
 for banks with risky portfolios. Setting these 
two interest rates equal, the resulting minimum capital requirement is
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k* =
[0,8−−0,02 1− ]
[
1−
 −0,8 −0,02
1−
 ]
.
Assuming that banking regulation imposes a capital requirement of k* (strictly speaking, it 
needs to be either k* with a complementing deposit ceiling, or k* ), it can be concluded 
that the bank is better off with a trader who invests prudently.
Yet, considering the bank's ignorance of the trader's strategy, the entire equilibrium concept is 
problematic. If the bank presumes the trader will produce a risk-free return γ, i.e. it incorrectly 
believes  that  =1 ,  it  is  likely  to  offer  depositors  a  higher  interest  rate  of  up  to 
r Skilled=0,80,21k −0,02k−0,02 .  This  cannot  be  an  equilibrium interest 
rate, as the bank can only maintain this interest as long as the trader's gamble does not fail. On 
the other hand, an equilibrium where the bank  knows the trader is gambling and pays  its 
depositors the risk-adjusted rG is not plausible either,  presuming the bank can choose to not 
employ a trader at all: No matter whether the bank wants to gamble or invest prudently, it can 
do both on its own, without hiring an expensive but unskilled trader.
Thinking back to the trader's incentives, is it a plausible assumption that his discount rate will 
keep him from gambling? No, for three reasons. First, traders empirically tend to focus on 
short-term objectives.  Unlike owners of a bank who are likely to be concerned about the 
bank's long-run profits and reputation, traders often focus on the next couple of years, as they 
do not know how the market will change, or for how long they are going to stay with their 
current employer anyway. Hence, they may either have a low discount rate, or alternatively 
their  decision-making  may  be  subject  to  a  “present  bias”,33 which  sharply  increases  the 
discount rate needed for prudent investment. Secondly, a bank hires a trader to consistently 
deliver returns above a benchmark. If a trader would actually stick to the benchmark asset for 
several years, the shareholders of the bank will figure that he is not skilled. In this case they 
can  save  on  his  substantial  management  fee  by  just  investing  in  the  benchmark  asset 
themselves,  or  alternatively  they  can  hire  another  trader  who  promises  higher  (but  safe) 
returns. The competitive pressure in the labour market may thus cause an unskilled trader to 
gamble even if his discount rate is high, simply because he would lose his job otherwise. 
Thirdly, the hedge fund case illustrates that the derivatives market often allows the trader to 
“tailor” assets and their risk to his needs. If, say, he has a discount rate of  =0,92  so the 
risky asset above is not attractive to him, he can probably find (or create!) another risky asset 
33 See the literature on quasi-hyperbolic discounting, e.g. Laibson (1997).
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which is: Take a second risky asset with a return =1,12  and =0,95 , yielding a critical 
≥0,94 for prudent investment. The trader will then prefer the safe asset over asset γ but 
also  prefer  asset  τ  over  the  safe  asset.  The  second  and  third  argument  tie  in  together: 
Competitive pressure is likely to force even traders with a high discount rate to search or 
create risky assets which are suitable given their preference structure.
Taking this into consideration, what is likely to happen? The trader will gamble and is likely 
to  get  by  with  it  for  a  while,  causing  the  bank  to  pay  rSkilled (depending  on  competitive 
pressure) to depositors. As this is an opportunity to quickly earn substantial profits, mediocre 
traders and outright “con artists” are likely to be attracted into the market. Once gambles start 
to  fail,  some banks  will  default  on  their  depositors,  and  the  market  will  learn  about  the 
frequency  of  unskilled  traders.  With  banks'  inability  to  distinguish  skilled  and  unskilled 
traders,  a  market  failure  due  to  adverse  selection  is  possible:34 Banks  will  adjust  traders' 
compensation  for  the  risk  involved  in  attracting  an  unskilled  trader.  This  might  drive 
genuinely skilled traders out of the market, which in turn increases the proportion of unskilled 
traders until eventually no skilled traders are left,  the market collapses, and no traders are 
employed.
But for now, let us abstract from such equilibrium considerations. One question which has not 
been addressed so far is how banking regulation (such as capital requirements and interest 
ceilings) and deposit insurance granted by the government interact with the motives and the 
decision making of the trader. The answer is as simple as it is shocking: They don't.
Given  a  compensation  structure  as  discussed,  and  assuming  that  the  trader  was  hired  to 
generate excess returns, the trader will not be concerned whether he is losing the depositors' 
money,  or  whether  it  is  the  bank's  own  money  that  he  is  losing.  While  high  capital 
requirements might thus suffice to make sure it is not in shareholders' interest to gamble, the 
ratio of equity capital in the bank's balance sheet will be of no relevance to the incentives of 
the trader. The case is similar for deposit insurance: If his gamble fails, the trader knows he 
will be fired anyway – it does not matter to him whether the bank goes insolvent, and whether 
depositors get their money back or not.
In conclusion, the result of inserting a Foster and Young trader into the HMS model of moral 
hazard was that the two models only weakly interact with each other, and run separately for 
the  most  part.  While  at  very  first  sight  this  may  seem  like  an  uninteresting  result,  the 
34 See the original literature on adverse selection using the classical example of automobile “lemon markets” in 
Akerlof (1970). Also see Foster/Young (2008), p. 22.
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consequences of finding corresponding structures in reality would be disastrous: In Foster's 
and  Young's  hedge  fund  case,  losses  are  borne  by  wealthy,  large-scale  institutional  and 
private investors – a small fraction of the population. If, however, it were true that traders 
with the incentive structure described were entrusted with investing money stemming from 
insured bank deposits, then it would be the government, and lastly the average taxpayer, who 
pays for the losses generated by the ruthless gambling of a few bank employees.35 
Summing up, the theoretical  considerations of this chapter give rise to the conjecture that 
asymmetric bonus systems for bank employees can lead to excessive risk-taking, which in 
conjunction with deposit insurance leads to a financial burden for the taxpayer when the bank 
goes bankrupt. This behaviour can be prevented neither with capital requirements nor with 
deposit rate ceilings. When researching the empirical plausibility of this notion, it is important 
to  note  that  this  mechanism does not  necessarily  require  deposit  insurance:  The financial 
burden is comparable when banks are “bailed out” by the government (or the central bank), 
i.e. banks receive emergency financial support to prevent bankruptcy – usually financed by 
the taxpayer either directly or indirectly via the inflation tax.36 Further, the applicability of the 
model does not hinge upon the employee being a  trader of securities – any employee who 
influences  the  investment  process  and  who  is  paid  based  on  company  performance  (as 
managers usually are) has the same incentive structure. The remaining question is: Were there 
incidents during the credit crunch which, in their structure, bear resemblance to the model 
discussed? The next chapter will attempt to provide an answer by discussing selected case 
studies.
35 To calculate the exact loss for the deposit insurance corporation (and thus indirectly the taxpayer), the 
interest rate granted to depositors by the banks has to be multiplied by the volume of debt capital invested. As 
discussed, the bank is likely to offer rSkilled instead of rG to depositors – with the result that the cost of deposit 
insurance is even higher than if the bank was gambling itself.
36 See the literature on the controversial topic of the “lender of last resort”, modelled e.g. in Goodhart/Huang 
(1999).
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4 Moral Hazard in the Credit Crunch
The institutions most immediately affected by the credit crunch were mortgage lenders and 
traders of CDOs and other securitised assets, such as investment banks, hedge funds, and 
SIVs. Most of these institutions do not have an immediate connection to deposit insurance, as 
they do not rely on customer deposits for funding. However, the idea of flawed compensation 
systems  for  bankers  has  received  considerable  attention  in  the  recent  media,37 including 
several cases of individual traders causing huge losses to their companies.38 The following 
two case studies  represent  incidents  of moral  hazard via  gambling  bankers  and discuss a 
possible connection to deposit insurance. The last section of the chapter provides an overview 
of other possible sources of moral hazard which have led to, or have exacerbated, the turmoil 
associated with the current financial crisis. 
4.1 UBS
Few “victims” of the credit crunch caused as much surprise among investors as the Swiss 
bank UBS, which reported net losses of $37.7bn related to the U.S. subprime and Alt-A real 
estate market for the year 2007 ($18.7bn) and 2008Q1 ($19bn).39  With an asset volume of 
$2.2 trillion (CHF 2.4 trillion) and an annual profit of $11.2bn (CHF 12.3bn) in 2006, UBS is 
the second-largest bank in Europe, with a major presence in the United States.40 With a  return 
on equity (ROE) as high as 28.2 percent in 2006 and 39.7 percent in 2005,41 it was also one of 
the most profitable banks in the world – before the subprime meltdown.
37 Cf. e.g. Rajan (2008) or Robinson/Moghadassi (2008).
38 Cf. e.g. Chung/Mishkin (2008) and Guerrera/White (2008).
39 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 4, 7.
40 Cf. UBS (2007), pp. 82.
41 Cf. UBS (2007), p. 18.
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Figure 4: UBS Return on Equity 2005-2007 
Source: UBS (2008b), p. 33.
The ongoing subprime crisis suggests that these returns were too good to be sustainable: ROE 
crashed to -9.4 percent in 2007. Given that the UBS group is comprised of four individual 
businesses – Global Wealth Management, Asset Management, Investment Banking, and retail 
banking in Switzerland –  it seems remarkable that 84 percent of UBS's 2007 losses were 
incurred by the investment bank (IB), while only 16 percent are accounted for by Dillon Read 
Capital Management, a much-blamed internal UBS hedge fund.42
Within the IB, 66 percent of total  UBS's 2007 losses were contributed by the CDO desk 
within the Fixed Income business – a desk that at its peak comprised 35-40 out of UBS's total 
83,500 employees. The CDO desk had created CDOs from subprime collateral,  keeping in 
particular the super senior tranches. The main reason of the losses, according to a UBS report 
on the 2007 write-downs,  was the IB's  emphasis  on fast  growth:  After  the Fixed Income 
Business  in  2005 was  identified  as  its  “biggest  competitive  gap”,  major  revenue growth 
opportunities were seen in ABS, MBS and ARMs, each with underlying assets of subprime 
nature.43 The effect was the fast boosting of revenue at the expense of risk.
Even within the CDO desk, a further concentration of losses existed: After UBS had acquired 
assets from a collateral manager, but before these assets were structured into CDOs, tranched 
and sold on to third party investors, assets were held in a “CDO warehouse” for a time lag of 
1-4 months. For this period of time, risky subprime assets were held on UBS's books with full 
exposure to market risk. UBS risk control systems did not impose a limit on the business as to 
what asset volume could be held in the warehouse at a time. By end 2007, losses from CDO 
warehouse positions contributed16 percent of UBS's total losses (25 percent of CDO losses) .
The largest part of the CDO losses, however, is due to the insufficient hedging of retained 
super senior positions: The CDO desk not only kept most super senior tranches of the CDOs it 
had structured on UBS's own books, but it also purchased additional super seniors from third 
parties. Super senior positions held by the IB were either fully hedged (so-called “NegBasis 
trades”),  partially  hedged  (“Amplified  Mortgage  Portfolio  Super  Seniors”  or  AMPS),  or 
unhedged. Risk emanated primarily from a substantial number of AMPS trades: Presuming 
the accuracy  of  the AAA ratings  of  most  super  seniors,  statistical  analysis  indicated  that 
insuring against a loss of at most 2-4 percent on the total position of the relevant super seniors 
would fully protect UBS from exposure to their credit risk. With rising delinquency rates and 
falling CDO prices, losses from UBS's $50bn super senior inventory amounted to 50 percent 
42 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 7.
43 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 11.
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of  the total losses (75 percent of CDO losses). Remarkably, 31 percent of total UBS group 
losses resulted exclusively from AMPS trades.44 
The unsustainable growth strategy of the CDO desk was facilitated by an insufficiently robust 
risk control framework: No limits existed on subprime-related holdings. The reliance on AAA 
ratings led to AMPS and NegBasis trades being “netted out” in risk assessment (i.e. they were 
neutral in “Value-at-Risk” and Stress Loss testing) as they were considered fully hedged – 
and thus could be bought indefinitely.  CDO structuring transactions required ad hoc prior 
approval, which many times was requested at a stage when the underlying assets were already 
purchased, and when declining the deal would have been very costly. Finally, Market Risk 
Control (MRC) agreed to grant the CDO desk “a favourable treatment” in the risk assessment 
of the CDO warehouse. More generally, “risk systems and infrastructure were not improved 
because of a willingness by the risk function to support growth”.45
With $12bn losses (for 2007) caused by less than 0.05 percent of UBS's workforce, it seems 
indicated  to  look  at  the  particular  incentives  that  employees  within  the  CDO  desk  had. 
Unfortunately, their precise compensation and bonus structures are not known to the author, 
making an application of the theoretical structures discussed in chapter 3 difficult. However, 
UBS generally  claims  to  determine  bonus  payments  on  an  individual  basis  according  to 
employee performance. The UBS report further confirms that CDO traders were, like many 
other  UBS employees,  rewarded  asymmetrically:  While  they  were  likely  to  receive  high 
bonuses for furthering revenue growth of their respective business, they were not penalised 
for underperformance.46 Although this structure is common to many UBS employees, CDO 
traders might have enjoyed particularly good opportunities to simulate “genuine investment 
skill” in the Foster and Young sense (see section 3.3) without being detected. Job pressure in 
the Fixed Income business to catch up with competitors is likely to have enforced incentives 
to gamble. With the intransparency of CDOs and the failure of UBS risk control systems to 
“look through” to the quality of the underlying assets, it may have been easy for CDO traders 
to convince senior management or risk control units that CDOs with subprime collateral were 
a genuine opportunity to make what appeared to be easy, fast and practically riskless profits. 
They  could  support  their  argumentation  with  AAA ratings  of  super  seniors,  which  non-
experts in their field were likely to rely on.47  Even if CDO traders themselves knew better 
about the quality of the underlying assets they had purchased, they had strong incentives to 
44 Cf. UBS (2008a), pp. 13.
45 UBS (2008a), p. 40.
46 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 42.
47 Note that this argument ties in strongly with the inaccuracy of credit ratings due to the housing boom.
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invest  in  “Mezzanine CDOs” (not  to confuse with mezzanine  tranches),  which are CDOs 
made of lower quality MBS. Mezzanine CDOs generated fees three to four times as high as 
high-quality CDOs, but still had AAA rated super senior tranches. This made them a tempting 
opportunity for CDO traders  to generate  high short-term profits,  appear  “skilled”  to  their 
employers and yield high bonuses. Similarly,  they could boost profits of their business by 
saving on hedging cost: Hedging via AMPS trades cost 5-6 bp, while NegBasis trades cost 
11bp.48 With both being neutral from a risk metrics perspective, CDO traders clearly preferred 
AMPS trades – regardless of whether they knew that AMPS super seniors were likely to incur 
more than just a 2-4 percent loss. It could be argued that CDO traders themselves did not 
know how much risk they were taking.  However, this  does not seem plausible:  In March 
2007, the CDO desk gave a relatively pessimistic assessment of the subprime market to the 
(by then concerned) group senior management. At the same time, they proposed risk limit 
increases for the CDO warehouse. Although limit increases were rejected, warehouse activity 
continued, and the subprime CDO business kept growing significantly in 2007Q2.49
Is  there  a  connection  to  deposit  insurance?  Possibly.  The  UBS  IB  was  not  legally 
independent,  but  a  part  of  the  UBS  group's  “integrated  business  model,  with  a  
'one   firm approach' designed to  facilitate  [...]  the  exchange of  products  and distribution 
services between businesses”.50 Another part of this “integrated business” was UBS Retail 
Banking, holding both customer deposits insured by Swiss deposit insurance and deposits 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) within its U.S. branch. In the 
deposit insurance context, the “universal bank approach” generally has two advantages: First, 
interest rates on insured deposits tend to be relatively low because there is no risk premium 
involved. This may have contributed to the ample availability of cheap internal funding which 
UBS businesses enjoyed. A second “advantage” is that deposits would have been covered by 
the insurer in case of a UBS bankruptcy.  However, savings and deposit accounts made up 
“only”  $66bn (CHF 72.3bn)  of  UBS's  2007 balance  sheet.51 Since  UBS also  did  not  go 
bankrupt,  it  can  be  concluded  that  taxpayers  were  most  likely  spared  from  the  losses 
generated by a gambling CDO desk. Losses were mostly borne by shareholders. The small 
volume  of  insured  deposits  further  makes  it  implausible  that  deposit  insurance  created 
incentives for the bank as a whole (represented by shareholders) to gamble (note that traders' 
incentives are not influenced by deposit insurance anyway, see section 3.3). 
48 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 30.
49 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 37, 40.
50 Cf. UBS (2008a), p. 8, 25.
51 Cf. UBS (2008c).
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Although taxpayers may not have suffered from gambling UBS employees, structures present 
at UBS might be representative for other large banks: The “universal bank approach” became 
increasingly  popular  after  the  Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act  in  1999 allowed commercial  and 
investment  banks  to  consolidate.  This,  in  principle,  allows  investment  banks  to  receive 
significant parts of their funding from insured customer deposits. With the prevalent bonus 
systems  for bankers and the current  legal  framework,  cases of large failing banks due to 
gambling employees at the expense of deposit insurance thus do not seem hard to imagine.
While the application of our model in the UBS case was complicated by complex corporate 
structures, the next section presents a case of a significantly more transparent bank where the 
connection between subprime losses and deposit insurance is immediate. 
4.2 IndyMac
On Friday July 11, 2008, the California based bank IndyMac was closed down and seized by 
federal regulators, representing the biggest bank failure during the credit crunch (as of August 
2008), and the third-largest  bank ever to fail  in the United States.  The savings and loans 
association was the seventh-largest U.S. mortgage originator as of 2006, with a total asset 
volume of $32bn.52 
IndyMac was a specialist in Alt-A mortgages, a type of loan offered to customers who do not 
qualify  for  a  prime  loan  (e.g.  because  they  are  unable  to  fully  document  their  assets  or 
income),  but who have better  credit  quality than subprime borrowers.  Accordingly,  Alt-A 
interest rates are typically between prime and subprime rates. With a market share of 17.5 
percent of the U.S. Alt-A market and an origination volume of $70bn in Alt-A loans in 2006, 
IndyMac was the biggest  Alt-A lender  in the nation.53 However,  as most  other  mortgage 
originators, IndyMac did not keep the majority of their loans, but sold them on to investment 
banks  and  other  financial  institutions,  where  they  were  securitised  (i.e.  pooled  and 
repackaged) into the popular MBS.
IndyMac's performance during the mortgage boom was remarkable: According to IndyMac's 
quarterly  reports  to  the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC),  its  loan  production 
tripled between 2003 and 2006 (see table 1), leading to a fourfold increase in its mortgage 
market share. 
52 Cf. Chung/Scholtes (2008) and Paletta/Enrich (2008).
53 Cf. CRL (2008), p. 6.
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Total annual loan 
production in billion 
U.S. dollars
Mortgage industry 
market share (%)
Return on average 
equity (%)
2003 29 0.8 17
2004 38 1.4 17.4
2005 61 2.0 21.2
2006 90 3.3 19.1
2007 77 3.3 -31.1
IndyMac's  performance  reversed in  the  beginning  of  2007,  when mortgage  delinquencies 
increased dramatically.  Again, IndyMac's filings at SEC show that the volume of so-called 
“non-performing assets” went up from 0.51 percent of total assets in 2006Q3 to 6.51 percent 
in 2008Q154 – an almost 13-fold increase within a period of 18 months.  This reduced the 
firm's ability to sell loans to the secondary market, forcing them to hold more loans on their 
own books. IndyMac was further required to repurchase a substantial  number of deficient 
loans it had previously sold to investors (so-called “kick-backs”). During 2007 and 2008Q1, 
the company incurred a total loss of $799m, a sum bigger than its combined profits in 2005 
and 2006 ($636m). When the firm could no longer conceal its unsound condition from the 
public, a bank run in July 2008 caused IndyMac to collapse.55
The story of the bank provides a primary example of gambling: Long before the collapse of 
the bank, IndyMac was sued in numerous instances for misleading and defrauding mortgage 
costumers  to  reach  their  loan  origination  targets.  A  class  action  lawsuit  of  IndyMac's 
shareholders,  supported  by a  considerable  body of  evidence,  was  filed  in  2007.  While  it 
cannot be the purpose of this paper to verify allegations of a current court case, the following 
discussion will hypothesise all evidence contained in the legal complaint to be true and rely in 
particular  on  the  testimonies  of  witnesses.  In  the  official  legal  complaint,  eight  former 
IndyMac employees testify that senior management instructed all mortgage underwriters  “to 
abandon approval  guidelines  and push  all  loans  through for  approval  which  came in  the 
door”.56 In case of loan denials, applications are said to have gone to upper management who 
frequently overturned underwriters' decisions. Upper management was further responsible for 
setting  loan  origination  targets.  As  a  former  vice  president  of  the  company  testified, 
IndyMac's approval policies and internal risk assessment models could not easily be changed: 
54 Cf. SEC Info (2006), p. 4 and SEC Info (2008), p. 6.
55 Cf. Paletta/Enrich (2008).
56 Cf. Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), p. 11. 
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Table 1: IndyMac's Performance during the Mortgage Boom
Source: Data from www.secinfo.com, compiled in CRL (2008).
They were those of an Alt-A, not a subprime lender. Thus, “pushing through” loans of inferior 
credit quality frequently meant falsifying borrower's loan applications by inflating their stated 
income – with the result that risk assessment models provided loan approvals based on false 
information.57 The aggressive marketing of “stated income loans”, i.e.  loans which do not 
require income documentation, facilitated this practice and allowed IndyMac to charge higher 
interest  than  for  “full-doc”  loans.  Loans  with  deficient  documentation  became  known as 
“Disneyland loans” - in honour of a loan issued to a Disneyland cashier claiming to have an 
annual income of $90,000. A similar documented case is that of an 80-year-old retiree from 
Georgia who received a mortgage based on his application stating an income of $3,825 a 
month from Social Security – without the borrower himself knowing about this figure.58 
The profits  of IndyMac's  gambling  strategy were substantial:  Apart  from quadrupling  the 
firm's mortgage market share within 3 years, its margin on every loan issued was boosted by 
the company's efforts to sell highly complicated ARMs to uneducated borrowers, featuring 
“teaser rates” of 1.25 percent and “reset rates” as high as 9.95 percent a couple of months into 
the loan. Margins increased further when borrowers could be put into mortgages with higher 
interest rates or fees than they qualified for.59
Further evidence indicates that IndyMac's senior management chose to hedge inadequately 
against  credit  risk  to  preserve  its  high  margins,  representing  an  inconsistency  with  its 
reassurances toward its shareholders and the general public, claiming to be fully hedged.60 
What makes the IndyMac case worthwhile to look at? First, taking testimonies to be true and 
presuming  an  “anything  goes”  lending  policy  as  well  as  a  reluctance  to  hedge,  the  term 
“gambling” seems well-deserved.  Second, and most  importantly,  IndyMac incorporates all 
features of the bank discussed in the HMS model: Unlike most other mortgage lenders or 
investment banks who rely on issuing commercial paper for funding, IndyMac receives 60 
percent ($18.9bn in 2008Q1) of its funding from federally-insured customer deposits. Another 
33 percent ($10.4bn) are borrowings from the privately capitalised Federal Home Loan Bank 
system (FHLB).61 The privilege of deposit insurance comes with a price: IndyMac was subject 
to regulations by the FDIC as well as the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), requiring the 
bank to maintain a risk-adjusted capital ratio of at least 10 percent in order to be considered 
57 Cf. CRL (2008), p. 8. The CRL study  contains a good summary of the class action complaint.
58 Cf. Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), p. 16 and CRL (2008), p. 2.
59 See other documented lawsuits discussed in CRL(2008), e.g. CRL(2008), p. 10.
60 Cf. Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), pp. 28.
61 Cf. SEC Info (2008), p. 6.
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“well-capitalised”.62 Neither OTS nor FDIC, however, monitored the soundness of IndyMac's 
portfolio – just like portfolio composition was up to the bank in the HMS model. The collapse 
of IndyMac causes an estimated loss of $4bn-$8bn to the FDIC, potentially depleting more 
than 10 percent of its $53bn deposit insurance fund.63
How does the IndyMac story compare to the two models of moral hazard discussed in chapter 
3? The first question that arises asks if the company itself, represented by the shareholders, 
had an incentive to gamble (i.e. the case of the  original HMS model).  With shareholders' 
equity declining from $2.06bn in 2007Q1 to $0.95bn in 2008Q164 and IndyMac's stock price 
falling from $48 per share in April 2006 to $0.31 on July 10, 2008, this question can be 
answered with a clear No – it is highly unlikely that shareholders would have wanted the bank 
to take on this much risk (note that the volume of equity at risk was determined mostly by the 
capital requirement).
As for the second model of gambling traders, it has to be noted that IndyMac, by virtue of 
being a mortgage  originator, did not employ “traders” of securities. Nonetheless, IndyMac 
employees in various other positions were incentivised to “gamble”, i.e. support lending to 
borrowers of poor creditworthiness, via employee compensation structures:
○ Underwriters received bonuses if loan origination targets were reached, completely 
regardless of credit quality or whether the loans ultimately ended in default. These 
loan origination targets were set by senior management.65
○ IndyMac's own Fraud Investigation Department had no incentive to detect fraud 
(such  as  inflated  income  in  loan  applications).  Instead,  “auditor  bonuses  were 
based on the number of loans reviewed,  not the number of fraudulent findings 
found”.66 Auditors  were  thus  encouraged  to  review large  numbers  of  loans  as 
quickly as possible and without much in-depth attention.
Yet, if the evidence from the class action lawsuit is at least partially true, underwriters and 
auditors were little more than small cogs in a big wheel, steered by the senior management of 
the company – first and foremost, by IndyMac CEO Michael Perry.
Being the principal defendant of the class action lawsuit, testimonies claim that 
62 Cf. SEC Info (2008), p. 32 for a differentiation between “well-capitalised”, “adequately capitalised” and 
“undercapitalised” and the associated regulatory responses.
63 Cf. Paletta/Enrich (2008).
64 Cf. SEC Info (2008), p. 6.
65 Cf. Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), p. 14.
66 Cf. Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), p.  20.
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“Defendant Michael W. Perry recognized that in order for IndyMac to continue  
to grow at difficult times (which he thought 2006 would be), the Company would  
have  to  loosen  underwriting  standards  and quickly  dispose  of  risky  mortgage  
loans before borrowers defaulted, by selling them outright or securitizing them 
and  selling  them.  [...]Perry  had  manipulated  the  Company's  underwriting  
controls, and the exposure it faced from its obligations to buy back bad loans.  
Perry's plan, for a time, worked [...].
and further that
“Perry sought to make his short term goals for the Company “at all costs”. To  
this end, Perry put immense pressure on subordinates to “push loans through”, 
even if it  meant consistently making “exceptions” to the Company's guidelines  
and policies (at the expense of the company's future).67
Finally,  Perry  himself  admitted  that  “we  don't  hedge  as  we  talk  many  times”,  further 
disclosing that “the Company had intentionally allowed hedges on $1.5bn worth of liabilities 
to expire”, while at the same time “touting IndyMac's successful hedging techniques”.68
It does not come as a surprise that CEO Michael Perry had financial incentives to adopt a 
risky strategy and mislead investors about the company's situation. According to IndyMac's 
“Short-Term Cash Incentive Plan”,  Perry in  2006 received an entirely  performance  based 
“cash incentive” rewarding short-term growth, the amount of which depended on the achieved 
values of IndyMac's earnings per share (EPS) and its return on equity (ROE). SEC filings 
indicate that Perry would have received a $1m award for generating an EPS growth of 15 
percent towards 2005 and a ROE exceeding 19 percent. With the actual EPS values of $4.82 
(8.8 percent  more  than  2005),  and a  ROE of  19.1  percent,  he  still  received  a  payout  of 
$791,300. In addition to this “performance bonus”, Perry received a base salary of $1m.69
With a few simplifications, the incentive structure of Michael Perry can now be reconstructed 
using our model from section 3.3. First, Mr. Perry was not a trader, but his power to decide if 
the company was investing in a risky or a prudent strategy make him comparable to one. 
Second, while it is impracticable to derive returns α and γ of a safe and a risky asset in reality, 
Perry's base salary will be considered as the one-period gain he would have from prudent 
investment, i.e.  P=1 , with one unit being $1m. Third, it will be assumed that Perry's 
67 Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), p. 3.
68 Tripp vs. IndyMac (2008), p. 6.
69 Cf. SEC Info (2007), pp. 38.
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2006 bonus of roughly $800,000 represents his one-period gain from gambling if the gamble 
wins ( in a losing period he still receives his base salary). Therefore, G=0.81 . He can 
either gamble or invest safely – there is no such thing as “a little gambling”. Given that a 
failing gamble means that he loses his job, faces criminal charges and will not find a job 
again, the prudent future income he loses with probability 1−  is ∑
t=1
∞
tP=
P
1− . 
Using the formula from section 3.3, it is profitable for him to gamble if
G−P≥1−
P
1−
⇔0,8≥1− 1
1−
≤ 4⋅
5−
Assuming a winning probability of =0.8 , it was rational for Michael Perry to gamble if 
his discount rate was below *0.8=0.76 . Given a probability of =0.9 , a discount rate 
below *0.9=0.88 would have been sufficient.
The  implication  of  the  model  is  unambiguous:  If  Michael  Perry is  assumed  to  carry  the 
responsibility for IndyMac's risky business strategy, then his personal discount rate (or from 
an  institutional  perspective,  IndyMac's  compensation  scheme)  is  currently  costing  the 
taxpayer a sum of $4bn-$8bn.
4.3 Other Types of Moral Hazard
This paper has so far focused exclusively on the case of “gambling bankers” as an example of 
moral hazard which is likely to have played a costly role in the credit crunch. Nevertheless, 
had bankers been the  only agents subject to flawed incentives during this crisis, the crisis 
might  not  have  started  in  the  first  place,  or  at  least  have  been  of  substantially  weaker 
magnitude than experienced. Although a comprehensive discussion of all relevant types of 
moral hazard is beyond the scope of this paper, a few major channels are outlined in this 
section.
With increasingly competitive markets, mortgage lending institutions no longer distribute the 
majority of their products themselves, but instead use mortgage brokers as an intermediary. 
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These brokers are typically paid on a commission basis for the loans they sell (or recommend) 
to customers. Evidence from the subprime crisis indicates that incentives of mortgage brokers 
were often insufficiently aligned with the interest of (the owners of) the bank they worked for. 
In the typical example of the mortgage bank Countrywide, brokers were rewarded with a 0.5 
percent commission of the loan's value for a subprime loan, while the commission for the next 
higher category, an Alt-A loan, was a mere 0.2 percent of the loan.70 In addition, brokers were 
incentivised to sell ARMs with “teaser rates”, with commissions increasing in the level of the 
reset rate to which interest would jump after a short period. More generally, brokers could 
make substantial profits in the booming subprime market by selling high-cost loans to people 
with little income and poor credit – and in many cases could not be held liable if customers 
defaulted early into the loan.71 Evidently,  the moral  hazard issue involved here is  closely 
interconnected with the personal incentive of bank managers to pursue high-risk company 
policies and incentivise brokers accordingly (at the expense of the company's future).
Secondly, the role of credit rating agencies in the credit crunch is undoubtedly crucial. With 
accurate  credit  ratings,  many  banks'  risky  investment  strategy  simply  would  have  been 
prevented by internal risk control mechanisms. Even compensation structures which tempt 
traders to gamble could not have done as much harm,  had the risk of super seniors with 
subprime collateral been openly visible to investors. Yet, the question  why rating agencies 
failed to rate securities accurately is controversial. An inability to understand the complex and 
innovative instruments they were rating is one view on the topic. The claim that agencies 
were  biased  because  they  were  paid  by  the  issuers  whose  securities  they  were  rating  is 
another.72
As indicated in section 2.2, a third related issue of moral hazard is that of regulatory arbitrage 
via  unregulated  off-balance  sheet  vehicles  like  SIVs  and  ABCP  conduits.  The  HMS 
framework  from section  3.2 has  argued  that  capital  requirements  discourage  banks  from 
gambling. Specifically, the Basel I accord forces banks to put at least 8 percent of their own 
capital at risk, while Basel II is substantially more complex in its requirements (both apply 
whether  or  not  the  bank  holds  insured  deposits73).  However,  banks  could  evade  these 
regulations by selling their risky assets to legally independent SIVs or conduits, which they 
set up for this purpose. Since banks received significant commissions on the assets they sold, 
70 From a class action complaint against Countrywide, see White vs. Countrywide (2007), p. 8.
71 Cf. e.g. Brunnermeier (2008), p. 8.
72 See e.g. Economist (2007) for a discussion.
73 Banks with insured deposits are generally subject to further regulations by the insurer. 
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SIVs allowed them to reap the benefits from gambling while not having to keep risky assets 
on their own balance sheet. The liquidity backstops they granted to SIVs (see section 2.2) 
carried little or no capital charge. Exercised credit lines for the bank thus implied a balance 
sheet expansion financed by more borrowing. As a result, banks'  expected capital ratio was 
lower than required by regulators – without banks' creditors being aware of this. As shown in 
section 3.2,  a low capital ratio makes it profitable for banks to gamble, at the expense of their 
creditors.74
The above may provide a rationale of the crisis at Deutsche Industriebank (IKB), a German 
specialist in corporate lending which had to be rescued in August 2007 by the state-owned 
bank KfW and the German government, using roughly €11bn ($16bn) of taxpayers' money.75 
The difficulties emerged when Rhineland Funding, an IKB off-balance sheet conduit, had to 
draw on its €8.1bn ($12bn) credit line from the bank. This triggered a severe liquidity crisis at 
IKB, which subsequently had to be bailed out to prevent bankruptcy.  Rhineland had used 
short-term ABCP funding to  invest  in  structured  products,  part  of  which  were subprime-
related. When investors became suspicious about Rhineland's exposure to the U.S. subprime 
market, they refused to roll over its ABCP in July 2007, amidst the general drying up of the 
ABCP market (see  section 2.3). The IKB case illustrates how a lender with the reputation of a 
conservative “widows' and orphans'  stock”,  which invested in small  and medium German 
businesses, successfully evaded capital  regulations by setting up a conduit with a €12.7bn 
($18.6bn) asset volume in risky structured products at negligible $500 of equity capital.76
The three types of moral hazard described above are likely to have played a significant role in 
the developments of the 2007/2008 financial crisis. While further research should be directed 
at  their  structure  and  influence  on  the  crisis,  combinations  of  the  individual  types  (like 
gambling managers using regulatory arbitrage) are very plausible as well and should be given 
careful attention.
74 In terms of the HMS model, invested assets would increase to (1+x+k), with 1+x being debt, at unchanged k. 
Note that the argument here does not require deposit insurance: Without deposit insurance, competition for 
depositors is likely to force banks to voluntarily hold sufficient capital to signal they are investing prudently. 
However, if depositors are not aware that banks' effective balance sheet is larger than reported, and their 
capital ratio lower, they will not recognise the banks' incentive to gamble.
75 Total cost until August 2008, see Atzler/Haake (2008).
76 Cf. Wilson (2008), FAZ (2007) and Bartz/Atzler (2007).
34
5 Conclusion and Outlook
The present paper has examined the 2007/2008 credit crunch, aiming to clarify in what ways 
issues of moral hazard have facilitated and contributed to the emergence of the crisis. It has 
been  suggested  that  while  market  turbulences  were  amplified by  feedback  effects  from 
leverage-based risk-management, several types of moral hazard have been conducive to the 
establishment of the dysfunctional financial market structures which caused the turmoil in the 
first place. The core part of the paper focused on the type of moral hazard which is  created 
through asymmetric compensation systems for bank traders making investment decisions.
The  paper  has  argued  that  asymmetric  compensation  structures  of  bank  employees  can 
severely bias a bank's asset portfolio towards short-term revenue at the expense of high risk 
exposure. Empirical evidence from the credit crunch indicates the widespread nature of this 
phenomenon: It not only applies to security traders, but to a wide class of employees who are 
a) paid based on company performance and b) have some say in the riskiness of the bank's 
business strategy – i.e. in particular to traders as well as the management of banks and lending 
institutions in general. Note that the form of the institution – investment bank, commercial 
bank or specialised mortgage lender - is completely irrelevant for the incentives of the trader. 
Conversely,  the  consequences of  a  gambling  banker  much  depend  on  the  form  of  his 
employer.  Considering  that  the  original  HMS  model  was  designed  for  classical  deposit-
holding banks with deposit insurance, the question emerges whether the implication of the 
trader's  model  for  the  taxpayer  burden  applies  to  the  modern  investment  banks  which 
dominated  the  credit  crunch  media,  or  whether  the  presented  case  studies  are  isolated 
examples. What is the difference between investment banks and deposit-holding banks? Since 
1999, there is no legal separation. Accordingly, capital regulations like Basel II apply to both 
kinds of banks. Their major difference lies in the business model: An IB receives its funding 
from capital markets (like ABCP). Therefore, differences in regulation are mostly due to the 
extended  requirements  and  the  increased  supervision  imposed  on  banks  with  deposit 
insurance.  Regarding  the  financial  burden  of  gambling  bankers,  the  following  can  be 
summarised (assuming the affected bank goes bankrupt):
a) Deposit  insurance  pays  for  bankers'  gambling  in  cases  of  savings  and  loan 
institutions, commercial banks, and in cases of “universal banks” like UBS.
b) In classical  investment banks without deposit insurance (like Bear Stearns), the 
taxpayer pays for the gambling if the bank is bailed out on government cost (i.e. 
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because of a “too-big-too-fail policy”).
c) With neither deposit insurance nor bail-outs, the institution's creditors suffer the 
losses from gambling.  Note that if the bank can hide its risk exposure from its 
creditors (like in the case of off-balance sheet vehicles), the creditors will not even 
charge a risk premium.
The extent of the losses stresses the urgency of the need to reform compensation practices in 
the  financial  sector.  So  far,  reform  proposals  aimed  at  aligning  the  interests  of  bank 
employees and shareholders are controversial and range from penalties for underperformance 
(discourages skilled workers), over mandatory possession of equity stakes (they could hedge 
against their own exposure)77 to a simple reduction of the bonuses relative to base salaries 
(effectiveness only partial), all of which are difficult to implement on an industry-wide basis 
since no bank would want to start given competitive pressures.78 On that account, it appears 
that further research needs to be conducted before a sustainable solution can be implemented.
In  light  of  intense  ongoing  debates  about  the  adequacy  of  banking  regulation,  it  seems 
alarming that supervision frameworks which are based on capital requirements (like Basel II) 
will do nothing to prevent a bank from gambling, as long as its employees receive asymmetric 
bonuses. The core inadequacy in this context is the regulation's failure to take into account 
that a bank is not a single, unanimous decision maker – but that the incentives of individual 
traders  are  of  vital  importance.  As  long  as  the  incentives  of  those  who  actually  make 
investment decisions are not aligned with the interests of shareholders, regulations like Basel 
II will remain ineffective.
77 Cf. Foster/Young (2008), pp. 17. 
78 Cf. Heller (2008).
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